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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
NETCHOICE, LLC d/b/a NETCHOICE, a 501(c)(6)
District of Columbia organization; and COMPUTER
& COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION d/b/a CCIA, a 501(c)(6) non-stock
Virginia corporation,

Civil Action No.
4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF

Plaintiffs,
v.
ASHLEY BROOKE MOODY, in her official
capacity as Attorney General of the State of Florida;
JONI ALEXIS POITIER, in her official capacity as
Commissioner of the Florida Elections Commission;
JASON TODD ALLEN, in his official capacity as
Commissioner of the Florida Elections Commission;
JOHN MARTIN HAYES, in his official capacity as
Commissioner of the Florida Elections Commission;
KYMBERLEE CURRY SMITH, in her official
capacity as Commissioner of the Florida Elections
Commission; and PATRICK GILLESPIE, in his
official capacity as Deputy Secretary of Business
Operations of the Florida Department of
Management Services,
Defendants.
_________________________________
JOINT REPORT OF RULE 26 INITIAL CONFERENCE
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The Parties held a Rule 26(f) conference by telephone on July 16, 2021. In
accordance with Rule 26(f) and Local Rule 16.1, and the Court’s Initial
Scheduling Order dated June 10, 2021, the Parties to this action jointly submit the
following report.
I.

Nature of the Case
Plaintiffs challenged Florida Senate Bill 7072 (S.B. 7072), which seeks to

regulate how “social media platforms,” as defined by the statute, moderate content
posted by third parties. Plaintiffs allege that the statute violates the First
Amendment, the Due Process Clause under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
the Commerce Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause, and that the law is
preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Shortly after
filing the Complaint, Plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the
statute. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion, and the preliminary injunction took
effect on June 30, 2021. The State Defendants filed their answer and defenses on
July 15, 2021, contending, inter alia, that the challenged law passes constitutional
muster and that, insofar as Section 230 would purport to shield Plaintiffs and their
members from the provisions of the challenged law, Section 230 is
unconstitutional as applied.
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Plaintiffs’ Position
This constitutional challenge to S.B. 7072 turns on overwhelmingly legal as
opposed to factual issues. Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts four claims based on
constitutional violations and one claim based on preemption under Section 230.
The violations of the First Amendment and other constitutional provisions, as well
as the conflict with Section 230, are apparent from the plain text of the statute’s
provisions. Likewise, the discriminatory motivations behind the statute are equally
clear from, among other things, official public statements made by the Governor
and legislators in promoting and passing this law. Because this case can readily be
resolved on legal grounds with little, if any, further factual development, extensive
discovery is not necessary and would only serve to delay the proceedings.
In the interest of efficiently resolving this dispute, Plaintiffs intend to file an
early motion for summary judgment well before the close of discovery. The motion
will set forth why the claims in the Complaint should be resolved in Plaintiffs’
favor based on the text of S.B. 7072, the relevant legal authorities, materials in the
public record, and limited facts that are not subject to genuine dispute. By
establishing why S.B. 7072 is unconstitutional and why Plaintiffs are entitled to
judgment on the legal issues, the motion will in turn demonstrate the lack of any
need for discovery, much less the extensive and highly burdensome discovery that
the State apparently contemplates. If the State continues to insist on wide-ranging
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demands and/or subpoenas, it should demonstrate a legitimate and compelling need
and basis for such discovery in response to Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment. See, e.g., Google, Inc. v. Hood, 96 F. Supp. 3d 584, 598 (S.D. Miss.
2015) (recognizing that a state Attorney General’s subpoena that “interfere[d] with
Google’s [editorial] judgment” would “likely produce a chilling effect on Google’s
protected speech, thereby violating Google’s First Amendment rights”), vacated
and remanded on procedural grounds, 822 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2016); see also
Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) (“[I]t is
an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation which intrudes into
the area of constitutionally protected rights of speech . . . that the State
convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a
subject of overriding and compelling state interest.”).
State Defendants’ Position
S.B. 7072 regulates the content moderation decisions of social media
platforms, and Plaintiffs’ flagship claim is that such regulation violates the First
Amendment. To prevail on this theory, Plaintiffs must establish as a threshold
matter that the First Amendment protects their members’ choices about which
user-generated content to host. Resolving this threshold issue will require the Court
to answer questions of fact as well as law. How, as a practical matter, do Plaintiffs’
members decide which content to host and present to viewers? To what extent do
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Plaintiffs’ members intend to convey a message or curate speech around a central
theme through their content moderation decisions? What do Plaintiffs’ members
mean when they disclaim responsibility for the speech they host in their terms of
service? The Court cannot decide whether key provisions of S.B. 7072 regulate
social media platforms’ speech without first answering these and other questions of
fact. Many of the same and other related questions are also important to Plaintiffs’
preemption claim, which rests in part on Plaintiffs’ contention that their members
exercise editorial judgment through their content moderation decisions.
If the Court concludes that S.B. 7072 regulates activity protected by the First
Amendment, it will then need to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny. This
issue also depends in part on questions of fact. Common carriers are entitled, at
most, to very modest First Amendment protection, and common carrier status turns
in part on the extent of an entity’s market power and the availability of alternate
means by which consumers can obtain the service the entity offers. Moreover,
intermediate rather than strict scrutiny is the appropriate level of scrutiny for
certain regulations of speech by entities that are bottlenecks for the speech of
others. Whether Plaintiffs’ members are properly treated as common carriers and
whether they are bottlenecks for their users’ speech are thus additional legitimate
topics for discovery. And whichever level of scrutiny the Court adopts, it will need
to decide whether S.B. 7072 is justified in light of the nature and scope of the
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problem this law addresses. Whether Plaintiffs’ members engage in arbitrary and
unfair content moderation decisions is therefore another legitimate topic for
discovery.
Plaintiffs’ other claims likewise turn on questions of fact as well as law. For
example, Plaintiffs’ dormant commerce clause claim depends in part on the extent
to which S.B. 7072 burdens interstate commerce. And whether 47 U.S.C. § 230 is
consistent with the First Amendment depends in part on the extent to which
Plaintiffs’ members coordinate their content moderation decisions with
government actors.
While it is understandable that Plaintiffs would prefer to avoid discovery on
these and other topics, they chose to file this lawsuit and must bear the ordinary
burdens of civil litigation.
II.

Possibility of Settlement
Given the nature of this case, a settlement is highly unlikely. Nor do the

Parties believe there are alternative dispute resolution processes that would be
helpful in facilitating settlement.
III.

Proposed Timetables and Cutoff Dates
The Parties have not agreed to consolidate the preliminary injunction

proceedings with any other phase of this litigation.
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Plaintiffs’ Position
In light of the Court’s Initial Scheduling Order and Rule 16(b)(3)(A),
Plaintiffs propose the following deadlines:
● Joinder of other parties: August 6, 2021
● Amendment of pleadings: August 6, 2021
● Completion of discovery: November 15, 2021 (per the Court’s Initial
Scheduling Order)
● Filing of dispositive motions: November 15, 2021
Plaintiffs oppose the State’s request to extend the case schedule. In its Initial
Scheduling Order, the Court set a discovery deadline of November 15, 2021 and a
two-week trial period starting on February 22, 2022. It stated that “[t]hese dates
will be moved earlier on an agreed motion or on a contested motion showing good
cause. The parties should request a delay of these dates only for good cause.”
The State seeks to prolong each remaining stage of the litigation by many
months beyond the Court’s established deadlines, far in excess of the minimal, if
any, time needed for discovery in this case. The State does not attempt to explain
why it needs that much time. This delay is apparently designed to give the State
ample opportunity to engage in fishing expeditions while denying Plaintiffs the
chance to secure permanent relief in a timely manner. Without a permanent
injunction and a declaratory judgment invalidating the law, Plaintiffs and their
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members are left exposed to private actions alleging violations of S.B. 7072’s
extremely broad provisions, each of which carries the threat of onerous statutory
damages.1 In short, the State falls far short of showing “good cause” to delay the
proceedings, and such delay would cause substantial harm to Plaintiffs’ members.
State Defendants’ Position
To accommodate necessary third-party discovery from Plaintiffs’ members
and in light of the complexity and importance of the factual issues likely to be
disputed in this case, Defendants propose that the Court extend the deadlines in its
initial scheduling order as follows:
 Joinder of other parties: March 15, 2022
 Amendment of pleadings: March 15, 2022
 Completion of discovery: May 2, 2022
 Filing of dispositive motions: May 31, 2022
Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ position that the discovery cutoff and trial
dates previously set by the Court should be maintained. The Court has since
entered its Preliminary Injunction, enjoining the effectiveness of the challenged

1

This threat is not hypothetical. For example, separate putative class actions have been filed
against Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube in the Southern District of Florida, each seeking
statutory, actual, and punitive damages under Section 501.2041, Fla. Stat, the new contentmoderation law. ECF No. 21, Trump et al v. Facebook, Inc. et al, No. 1:21-cv-22440; ECF No.
16, Trump et al v. Twitter, Inc et al, No. 1:21-cv-22441; ECF No. 21, Trump et al v. YouTube,
LLC et al, No. 1:21-cv-22445.
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Florida law during the pendency of this action and preserving the status quo ante.
Because the defenses properly asserted by Defendants will require discovery from
third parties, in particular from some or all of Plaintiffs’ members—the real
plaintiff parties in interest here—and because Defendants reasonably anticipate
protracted motion practice in connection with their discovery efforts, a discovery
cutoff of November 15, 2021, is unreasonable, unnecessary, and highly prejudicial
to Defendants to the point of denying them due process. For the same reason, a
trial date of February 22, 2022, is unreasonable, unnecessary, and highly
prejudicial to Defendants to the point of denying them due process.
IV.

Initial Disclosures
The Parties agree to make Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures on or before

August 2, 2021. Rule 26(a)(2) and Rule 26(a)(3) disclosures will be made in
compliance with the Court’s Initial Scheduling Order.
V.

Discovery Plan
A. Scope and Form of Discovery
Plaintiffs’ Position
As outlined above, little to no discovery is needed—much less the extensive

and highly burdensome discovery that the State apparently contemplates—
because the constitutionality and enforceability of S.B. 7072 turns on legal issues
that can be resolved based on the statutory language, the governing case law,
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publicly available information, and limited facts that are not subject to any
genuine dispute. By no later than September 15, 2021, Plaintiffs intend to submit
an early summary judgment motion that crystallizes those issues and articulates
why the statute is both unconstitutional and preempted. Extensive discovery is
not only unnecessary, but would also interfere with and chill the very First
Amendment rights at issue in this case. See supra at 3-4 (citing cases).
Insofar as the State insists on pursuing aggressive discovery, Plaintiffs’ early
summary judgment motion will facilitate the efficient resolution of any remaining
disagreement concerning the appropriate scope of discovery. The motion will
confirm the key issues in dispute, and in response the State should be required to
“convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a
subject of overriding and compelling state interest,” Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546. That
is a streamlined approach that better enables the parties to narrow the areas of
disagreement and would allow the Court to resolve them in the concrete context of
Plaintiffs’ motion rather than on a piecemeal basis in response to various
discovery requests and/or subpoenas issued by Defendants.
If, despite Plaintiffs’ proposed approach, the Parties do proceed to engage in
more general discovery, Plaintiffs reserve the right to seek discovery from the
State on topics including but not limited to: (1) the legislative intent, process, and
communications related to the consideration and enactment of S.B. 7072; (2) any

10

Case 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF Document 122 Filed 08/02/21 Page 11 of 19

information and data used to inform and support the legislative findings and
provisions in S.B. 7072; (3) the scope of the law’s impact on individuals and
entities both within Florida and outside the State; and (4) the planned enforcement
of the statute by the State and its various agents or agencies. Plaintiffs also reserve
the right to seek to limit the number of discovery requests and/or depositions
allotted to each Party for the sake of efficiency and preventing abusive practices.
State Defendants’ Position
Plaintiffs’ objection that Defendants must “demonstrate a legitimate and
compelling need and basis” for “extensive and highly burdensome discovery” is
misplaced and premature, misstates the law concerning the scope of the protections
that the First Amendment affords a party opposing discovery, and mischaracterizes
the discovery that Defendants intend to take.
As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs’ objections are premature; an assertion of a
First Amendment privilege or a claim of a potential chilling effect are to be raised
and evaluated like any other privilege or alleged discovery burden, i.e., in relation
to specific discovery requests, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim
or defense[.]”) (emphasis added). Such objections cannot be interposed as a
complete and ab initio bar to discovery.
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Furthermore, in making their case for suppressing all discovery of evidence,
Plaintiffs rely on two cases in which the subjects of ongoing government
investigations sued to block the investigations on the ground that, if allowed to
continue, they would chill their free speech. This is a far-cry from the situation
here, where Plaintiffs are attempting to avoid the run-of-the-mill discovery
obligations that the federal rules impose on all civil litigants. Plaintiffs have made
no showing that discovery will seriously burden their First Amendment rights.
But even if they had, the information that Defendants intend to seek in
discovery is highly relevant, necessary to the presentation of their case, and
unavailable from other sources. For example, discovery regarding whether the
platforms seek to convey a particular message through the content they host; the
scope, meaning, and significance of their disclaiming in their terms of service of
responsibility for that content; the extent to which the platforms exercise any
editorial judgment in moderating content; and the extent to which the platforms
constitute a bottleneck over their user’s speech is essential for establishing whether
the platforms are engaged in First Amendment activity at all and, if they are, what
protections attach to that conduct under Supreme Court precedent. Discovery into
these and other topics discussed above is essential to Defendants’ case.
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B. Preservation of Potentially Discoverable Information
The Parties have agreed to take reasonable measures to preserve potentially
discoverable information and/or documents, including Electronically Stored
Information (ESI), that is relevant to this litigation from alteration or destruction
in the ordinary course of business. At this point, the Parties do not foresee issues
concerning the preservation of discoverable information.
C. Disclosure or Production of Electronic or Computer-Based Media
Subject to the parties’ positions concerning discovery in general (see Section
V.A, supra), the Parties may request production of electronic or computer-based
media (“Electronic Stored Information” or “ESI”). Electronic discovery shall be
limited to ESI that is reasonably available and accessible to the responding party
in the ordinary course of business. The term “ESI” shall include, but is not limited
to: email, word processing documents, spreadsheets, presentation documents,
images, audio, video, and audiovisual recordings, databases, computer systems
(hardware and software), servers, archives, backup for disaster recovery systems,
tapes, discs, drives, cartridges, and other storage media, handheld wireless
devices, mobile telephones, and paging devices.
Identification and Production of Discoverable ESI: The Parties shall review
all ESI that has been identified as containing relevant discoverable information for
responsiveness and privilege. In accordance with the guidelines described herein,
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the Parties shall produce ESI that is responsive and not privileged or otherwise
protected. The producing party shall list on a privilege log any responsive ESI to
which it claims a privilege or other protection.
Scope and Cost Required: The Parties do not expect that the cost and time
required for disclosure or production of ESI will be beyond what is reasonably
available and accessible to the Parties in the ordinary course of business.
Form of Production of ESI: ESI shall, to the extent possible, be produced in
an accessible standard format and on a standard media (e.g., hard drive, thumb
drive, or CD-ROM) or via email, an online server, or an online file transfer
system. As a general matter, ESI should be produced in its native format. If any
ESI is not readable, the producing party may elect to produce such information in
hard copy format. Any ESI produced must include sufficient information to
identify the author, sender, and recipient of the document as well as the date of its
creation, revision, and/or transmission.
D. Other Discovery Matters
Discoverable materials in this case, if any, may include personally sensitive
information and information prohibited by law from disclosure to third parties. The
Parties are currently drafting and plan to file a proposed Protective Order to govern
any materials that may be produced in discovery in this case.
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VI.

Motions Practice
Plaintiffs’ Position
As discussed above, Plaintiffs intend to file an early motion for summary

judgment by September 15, 2021 if not sooner. Plaintiffs do not plan to file other
dispositive motions prior to that motion.
State Defendants’ Position
Defendants do not intend to file a dispositive motion until the close of
discovery. While the rules permit Plaintiffs to move for summary judgment at any
time, Defendants will invoke their rights under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(d) to the extent that an early summary judgment motion by Plaintiffs turns on
disputed facts. Defendants do not believe that litigating serial summary judgment
motions by Plaintiffs while discovery is ongoing will promote the efficient
resolution of this case.
As officers of the Court, undersigned counsel agree to cooperate with each
other and the Court to promote the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
this action.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Douglas L. Kilby
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Ilana H. Eisenstein (admitted pro hac
vice)
Ben C. Fabens-Lassen (admitted pro hac
vice)
Danielle T. Morrison (admitted pro hac
vice)
DLA PIPER LLP (US)
One Liberty Place
1650 Market Street, Suite 5000
Philadelphia, PA 19103-7300
Phone: 215-656-3300
Fax: 215-656-3301
Email: ilana.eisenstein@dlapiper.com
ben.fabens-lassen@dlapiper.com
danielle.morrison@dlapiper.com
jonathan.green@dlapiper.com

Douglas L. Kilby
Florida Bar No. 0073407
Glenn Burhans, Jr.
Florida Bar No. 0605867
Bridget Smitha
Florida Bar No. 0709581
Christopher R. Clark
Florida Bar No. 1002388
STEARNS WEAVER MILLER
WEISSLER ALHADEFF &
SITTERSON, P.A.
Highpoint Center
106 East College Avenue, Suite 700
Tallahassee, FL 32301
Phone: (850) 580-7200
Email: dkilby@stearnsweaver.com
gburhans@stearnsweaver.com
bsmitha@stearnsweaver.com
crclark@stearnsweaver.com

Christopher G. Oprison
Florida Bar No. 0122080
J. Trumon Phillips
Florida Bar No. 84568
DLA PIPER LLP (US)
200 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2500
Miami, Florida 33131
Phone: 305-423-8500
Fax: 305-675-6366
Email: chris.oprison@dlapiper.com
trumon.phillips@dlapiper.com
sheila.hall@dlapiper.com

Lauren Gallo White
(admitted pro hac vice)
Meng Jia Yang
(admitted pro hac vice)
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH &
ROSATI, P.C.
One Market Plaza
Spear Tower, Suite 3300
San Francisco, CA 94105
Phone: (415) 947-2000
Email: lwhite@wsgr.com
mjyang@wsgr.com

Peter Karanjia (admitted hac vice)
James J. Halpert (pro hac vice

Brian M. Willen
(admitted pro hac vice)
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forthcoming)
DLA PIPER LLP (US)
500 Eighth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004
Phone: 202-799-4000
Fax: 202-799-5000
Email: peter.karanjia@dlapiper.com
jim.halpert@dlapiper.com

Steffen N. Johnson
(admitted pro hac vice)
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH &
ROSATI, P.C.
1700 K St NW
Washington, DC 20006
Phone: (202) 973-8800
Email: bwillen@wsgr.com
sjohnson@wsgr.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff NetChoice, LLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff Computer &
Communications Industry Association

/s/Blaine H. Winship
Blaine H. Winship
Florida Bar No. 356913
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Complex Litigation Bureau
Daniel W. Bell
Florida Bar No. 1008587
Chief Deputy Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General of
Florida
The Capitol, Suite PL-01
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Telephone: (850) 414-3300
Facsimile: (850) 488-4872
Blaine.winship@myfloridalegal.com
Daniel.bell@myfloridalegal.com
Attorneys for Defendants Ashley
Moody, in her official capacity as
Attorney General of Florida; Joni
Alexis Poitier, in her official capacity
as Commissioner of the Florida

/s/Charles J. Cooper
Charles J. Cooper (248070DC)
David H. Thompson (450503DC)
Brian W. Barnes*
Joseph O. Masterman (Florida Bar
No. 1004179)
COOPER & KIRK, PLLC
1523 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 220-9600
ccooper@cooperkirk.com
dthompson@cooperkirk.com
bbarnes@cooperkirk.com
jmasterman@cooperkirk.com
*Admitted pro hac vice
James W. Uthmeier
Florida Bar No. 113156
General Counsel
Raymond F. Treadwell
Florida Bar No. 93834
Chief Deputy General Counsel
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR RON
DESANTIS
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Elections Commission; Jason Todd
Allen, in his official capacity as
Commissioner of the Florida Elections
Commission; John Martin Hayes, in
his official capacity as Commissioner
of the Florida Elections Commission;
and Kymberlee Curry Smith, in her
official capacity as Commissioner of
the Florida Elections Commission

Office of the General Counsel
The Capitol, PL-05
Tallahassee, FL 32399
(850) 717-9310
James.Uthmeier@eog.myflorida.com
Ray.Treadwell@eog.myflorida.com
Attorneys for Defendant Patrick
Gillespie, in his official capacity as
Deputy Secretary of Business
Operations of the Florida Department
of Management Services

18

Case 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF Document 122 Filed 08/02/21 Page 19 of 19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Counsel certifies that the foregoing document was electronically served on all
counsel of record via the CM/ECF system on this 2nd day of August, 2021.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Douglas L. Kilby
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